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I. Introduction
In May 2002, after a controversial debate, Germany finally implemented a new single
supervisory body for the financial markets, the Bundesanstaltflir Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
(Federal Financial Services Supervisory Body, hereafter referred to under the German ac-
ronym, "BaFin"). The new agency, however, became operational largely within the tradi-
tional legal and institutional setting. The previously independent finctions of the prudential
supervision of banks and insurance companies and the market supervision of the securities
markets are now exercised from within a common roof, but nonetheless under the old
statutory regime, which continues to reflect a functions-based rather than a unified ap-
proach to financial regulation as a whole.' Particularly with respect to deposit insurance,
no effort has been made to alter the existing infrastructure and bring it in line with the
concept of substantive integration of the various facets of financial safety nets. As a con-
sequence, the operational independence and important role of the country's strongest
provider of deposit insurance, a fund set up by the association of private banks, was left
altogether untouched. A capable scheme with a wide mandate encompassing insolvency
prevention, active crisis management, and ultimately, the pay-out of insured deposits, the
fund continues to co-exist with the single financial regulator-a good example of a deposit
insurer tailored to the needs and peculiarities of the market in which it operates.
This article presents an introduction to the structure of deposit insurance in Germany
in light of the market setting in which it operates, as well as an analysis of the co-existence
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of deposit insurers and the single financial services regulator. Specifically, it addresses the
impact of regulatory competition on the overall performance of financial supervision.
The text is structured as follows: following a brief description of the German banking
system, the article summarizes the 2002 structural changes to the institutional framework
for the conduct of banking supervision. Thereafter, it addresses the evolution of the concept
of deposit insurance in Germany, both as a result of the notorious Herstatt case in 1974
and of the transposition of the EC Deposit Guarantee and the EC Investor Compensation
Directives in 1998. In this context, the focus is on the Deposit Protection Fund set up by
the Private Bankers' Association which, compared with the growing body of internationally
accepted standards of best practice in this area,2 continues to be a unique model of a privately
organized deposit scheme offering virtually full coverage for insured deposits.
1I. A Short Note on the German Banking System
From the 19th century onwards, financial markets within Germany have always been
bank-dominated. Traditionally, large banks also exercise significant influence on large cor-
porate enterprises not only as lenders but also as shareholders. Even today, banks occupy a
strong position in the financing of Germany's mostly medium-sized, or Mittelstand, busi-
nesses while the development of exchange-based capital markets is stagnating. Direct, that
is non-intermediary finance by way of the issue of stock or bonds, remains an option almost
exclusively open to large corporations.'
Again for historical reasons, the retail markets-on which this article inevitably focuses-
are divided unevenly between three different types of banking institutions, namely (i) public
savings banks (Sparkassen), (ii) cooperative banks (Volks- and Raiffeisenbanks), and (iii) private
banks. All of these are, more or less, operating as universal banks. They are, for example
engaging in taking of deposits, granting of loans to both private and commercial customers,
and providing of payment services and bank accounts, as well as securities services. The
difference between the three groups is not therefore one of essentially different business
models, but rather one of ownership and legal status.
A. PUBLIC SAVINGS BANKS
Public savings banks were first introduced in 1801 in the state of Prussia to provide the
general public with basic but affordable banking facilities. From the beginning, the state,
or more accurately, local councils, owned and guaranteed public savings banks. Even today,
by law, local councils exclusively own the banks and are, in turn, obliged by statute to ensure
that the banks are able to meet their obligations at all times (the so-called Anstaltslast, or
"maintenance obligation"). In addition, the banks enjoy what has become known as the
Gewdihrtragerhaftung, or "guarantee obligation"-for example, full liability of the local
council in the event of default of a savings banks. As a consequence, there have been no
open insolvencies of public savings banks in the past, even though these institutions have
2. Cf., Financial Stability Forum, Guidance for Developing Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (2001), available
at http://www.fsforum.org/publications/Guidance-deposit01.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
3. For recent statistical data, see THE GERMAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 71-105 (J.P. Krahnen & R.H. Schmidt
eds., Oxford 2004). On the development of organized equity markets, see id., at 139-159. On IPOs and venture
capital, see id. at 233-255.
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broadened their scope of activities. All cases of financial difficulties have been resolved either
by way of recapitalization by the bank's owners or, alternatively, through mergers with other
savings banks. 4 Savings banks are closely linked to the Landesbanks, large banking institu-
tions owned by the federal states and acting as commercial banks to these states, as well as
head organizations for the savings banks groups. As of December 2000, there were some
550 savings banks operating within the country. This figure subsequently diminished, how-
ever, due to the recent trend of consolidation within the savings banks group. Together,
savings banks and Landesbanks occupy a significant market share, close to 40 percent in non-
bank loans (late 1990s).5 Under an agreement with the EC commission, the legal privileges
of public savings banks are to be phased out gradually, with the unlimited guarantees under
Anstaltslast and Gewabrtragerbaftung to be abandoned by 2005.6 In all likelihood, however,
insolvency of public savings banks will continue to be rare.
B. COOPERATIVE BANKS
Cooperative banks were founded in the 19th century as a means to facilitate the provision
of bank loans to craftsmen and farmers in particular, who were unable to obtain such loans
from either private banks or savings banks due to restrictive criteria with regard to the
provision of security. Cooperative banks are still mostly owned by local members. Since
1972, all cooperative banks have been united in the German Association of Volks- and Raif-
faisenbanks, which-similar to the German Association of Savings Banks-serves as a
country-wide link between different banks and two central institutions, WGZ-Bank and
DZ-Bank. These banks provide their members with clearing facilities, access to national
and international financial markets, liquidity support (if necessary), and centralized back-
office facilities. The business of credit cooperatives-some 1,400 as of September 20047-
continues to focus on local markets. Only in 1972 have non-members become eligible to
receive loans. The combined asset base of the group amounted to 920 billion Euro at the
of end 2000, with a customer base of thirty million. This made a market share in the market
for banking services of some 13 percent.8 Due to intensive cooperation and support within
the cooperative banking sector, all cases of financial difficulties in the past were resolved by
way of bail-outs or mergers with other members of the group, thereby avoiding outright
liquidation with consequential losses to depositors.
C. COMMERCIAL BANKS
Commercial banks form the third group of credit institutions active in the retail markets.
This group is comprised of four large, internationally active joint stock banks: Dresdner
Bank (founded in 1872), Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank (both founded in 1870), and
4. Public savings banks are public law bodies and, pursuant to the applicable laws, prohibited from merging
with private commercial banks.
5. For further detail, cf KRAHMEN & SCHMIDT, supra note 3, at 78-82.
6. See generally, E. Wiesel, Sparkassen und Landesbanken aufdem Priifstand des europidiscben Wettbezverbsrechts.
Chancen und Risikenfir die Sparkassenfinanzgruppe, 2002 ZEITSCHRIFT FiOR BANKBETRIEB uND BANKWIRTSCHAFT
288-299.
7. According to WGZ-Bank. See WGZ-Bank, at http://www.wgz-bank.de/servlet/PB/menu/1167380-11/
index.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).
8. See generally, KRAHMEN & SCHMIDT, supra note 3, at 83-85.
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since 1998, also Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank, the result of a merger of two large
Bavarian banks. These institutions continue to act as "house banks" to Germany's large
industrial corporations and form the core of the commercial banking group. Given the
dominating influence of public savings and cooperative banks, the four major private com-
mercial banks have not reached a combined market share in bank deposits exceeding four-
teen percent (end of 2000). By the end of 2000, they operated 2,873 branches compared to
16,892 branches of the savings bank group and 15,332 branches of the cooperative banking
group. The commercial banking group is further comprised of 255 regional banks, other
commercial banks, and private bankers, which are usually small institutions with long-
standing traditions that often focus on the provision of high-end services. 9 All past cases of
bank insolvency occurred in the commercial banking sector, typically affecting small or
medium-sized institutions with only regional standing.
D. SUMMARY
In summary, it is worth noting that the problem of bank insolvency in the German
banking system has been and continues to be one to which only a fraction of the banking
sector as a whole are exposed, namely private banks. This is particularly noteworthy in the
context of this article since, although deposit insurance systems have also been created for
public savings banks and cooperative banks, only the arrangements available for private
institutions are of practical relevance.
M. The Regulatory Framework
A. OVERVIEW
Prior to 2002, the responsibility for financial markets regulation in Germany used to be
divided between three different federal agencies and several exchange supervisory author-
ities (Borsenaufsichtsbehorden) in those federal states (Lander) that host stock or commodities
exchanges. On May 1, 2002, a new single financial regulator, the Bundesanstaltfiir Finanz-
dienstleistungsaufiicht, became operational. The Anstalt is located in both Frankfurt and
Bonn-a reflection of the previous situation, partly due to arrangements made with respect
to the transfer of the German capital from Bonn to Berlin, in return for which Bonn was
guaranteed certain administrative functions."°
The new body is responsible for the supervision of banking activities, the licensing of
both credit institutions and securities firms, and the on-going supervision of prudential
standards concerning those firms formerly within the ambit of the Federal Banking Super-
visory Office, (Bundesaufsichtsamt fir das Kreditwesen) under the Kreditwesengesetz of 1961
(as amended, the Banking Act)." Furthermore, it is in charge of surveillance of the provision
of investment services, which used to be performed by the Securities Supervisory Office
(Bundesaufsichtsamt fir den Wertpapierhandel) under the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz of 1998 (the
Securities Trading Act). 2 Lastly, the agency licenses and supervises insurance firms and thus
9. See generally, id. at 75.
10. See the explanatory notes to the Bill, which refer expressly to the "Berlin/Bonn-Gesetz" of 26 April
1994, BGBI 1994-I, p. 918.
11. Gesetz iiber das Kreditwesen (Kreditwesengesetz) [KWG], v. 9.9.1998 (BGBI. I S.2776).
12. Gesetz uiber den Wertpapierhandel (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) [WpHG], v. 9.9. 1998 (BGBI. I S.2708).
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incorporates the functions of the Federal Insurance Supervisory Office (Bundesaufiichtsamt
fir das Versicherungswesen) under the Versicherungsaufricbtsgesetz of 1901 (as amended, the
Insurance Supervision Act)."
The new agency, in effect the result of a merger of the existing three federal agencies,
marks the end of the previous, predominantly functions-based federal structure. It will,
however, continue to operate broadly within the existing statutory framework. The reform
has been confined to institutional aspects, and there have been no major amendments to
the substantive regulatory laws. 14 At the Linder level, the reform leaves untouched the
existence of local Exchange Supervisory Bodies (Borsenaufsichtsiimter), the listing authorities
that supervise the trading process."5 Similarly, local bodies at the Lander level remain re-
sponsible for the supervision of minor insurance firms of only regional relevance.
B. METHODS OF SUPERVISION AND SUPERVISORY CRISIS MANAGEMENT
In principle, the reform has also left untouched the armory of regulatory competencies
exercised by the three federal authorities under the respective legal framework. These in-
clude wide discretionary powers, generally in the form of the authorization to issue "direc-
tions" or "orders" 16 to regulated institutions that are complemented by a range of more
specific competencies, inter alia to gather information, 7 and if deemed necessary, to revoke
the license of regulated institutions.'"
In addition, the Banking Act and the Insurance Supervision Act provides detailed com-
petencies with regard to financial crises in regulated institutions, which prescribe a gradual
administrative interference with the affairs of troubled institutions. These powers include
the imposition of an administrative moratorium on supervised institutions and, to a con-
siderable extent, substitute general insolvency law for that purpose. In practice, once aware
of a crisis that requires immediate response, the regulator closes the relevant institution,
freezes its assets, and later petitions before the ordinary courts for liquidation in accordance
with general insolvency law.19
The reform act provides for the harmonization of the current set of administrative sanc-
tions available under the different laws,20 while the criminal sanctions for contraventions of
the regulatory requirements continue to be determined by the relevant statutes.2'
13. For an in-depth comparison of the regulatory bodies and their functions. See VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHTS-
GESETZ MIT EUROPMISCHEM GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT UND RECHT DER BUNDESLiNDER 136-149 (Prolss & Schmidt
eds., 1 th ed. 1997).
14. Under a series of legislative amendments currently underway, the agency will, however, assume additional
functions, for example, with regard to the supervision of registered accountants.
15. See AsSMANN & SCHNEIDER, WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ. KOMMENTAR, (3rd ed. 2003), s.4 Securities
Trading Act, rn. 3-7; Gesetziiber den Wertpapierhandel (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) [WpHGI, v. 9.9. 1998
(BGBI. I S.2708) § 4.
16. See ss.6(2) Banking Act, 4(1) Securities Trading Act, 81(2) Insurance Supervision Act.
17. See ss. 24 (notification of specific events), 25 (monthly returns) and 26 (annual reports), 44 (request for
further information and on-site inspections) Banking Act; 16 (insider dealing), 29(1) (general disclosure re-
quirements), 35(1) (compliance with rules of conduct) Securities Trading Act; 83 Insurance Supervision Act.
18. Ss. 35(2) Banking Act, 87 Insurance Supervision Act.
19. See ss.45-46b Banking Act; 88, 89 Insurance Supervision Act. For a detailed discussion, seeJens-Hinrich
Binder, Bankeninsolvenzen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Banksufsichts- tod Insolvenzrecht. Regelungsziele,
Anwendungsprobleme und Reformansiitze, dargestellt am Beispiel des deutschen und des englischen Rechts,
at §§ 7, 13 (2003) (unpublished doctoral thesis, Univ. Of Freiburg) (on file with author).
20. See s.17 FinDAG.
21. See ss. 56 Banking Act, 38, 39 Securities Trading Act.
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The new Bundesanstalt also continues to enjoy the various rule-making competencies in
place under the respective statutes. In accordance with a number of provisions in the Bank-
ing Act, the Insurance Supervision Act, and the Exchange Act, the supervisory authority is
empowered to issue sub-delegated secondary legislation in the form of Rechtsverordnungen.22
The agency also retains the right to issue "soft law" instruments such as "guidances" or
"principles." An important example of these can be found in Banking Act sections 10 and
11 of the Banking Act, which provide for the issuance of "principles" interpreting the
provisions' abstract criteria for capital adequacy and liquidity standards." While these so-
called "principles" are not legally binding stricto sensu, particularly not in relation to judicial
review before the courts, they indicate how the Supervisory Office will exercise its discretion
under the Act, for example, with respect to corrective action under section 45 of the Banking
Act.24 However, under the Gleichheitsgrundsatz (Principle of Equality) found in article 3 of
the Grundgesetz (the German Constitution), the Supervisory Office is bound to apply these
principles to all credit institutions in the same way so that, in effect, they might be char-
acterized as "quasi-binding."2s
It seems noteworthy that unlike developments in the United Kingdom for example, the
desire to improve the regulatory framework specifically with regard to crisis management
was never among the primary reasons for reform. Similarly, no attempt has been made to
alter the institutional framework for deposit insurance, for example, to increase its links
with the new authority.
In principle, the reform does not affect the mechanisms for the coordination of super-
visory activities with the Bundesbank. Indeed, the Bundesbank's competencies in particular
under the Banking Act in particular have become more refined.26 Consequently, the Bun-
desbank remains an integral part of the conduct of banking supervision in Germany. It
continues to be closely involved in the collection of information about market participants,
and its local branches remain the supervisory "watchdog" in the regions. When the Bun-
desanstalt decides to order on-site inspections, it may do so through the Bundesbank and its
local branches.27
Specifically with regard to crisis management, it is worth noting that unlike the UK for
example, Germany has never had a tradition of "Lender of Last Resort" operations on the
part of the Central Bank, other than ordinary liquidity support to the banking sector on a
day-to-day basis. Following the crash of Bankhaus Herstatt in 1974, however, the Bundesbank
(as a majority shareholder) and major market participants set up the so-called Liquiditiits-
Konsortialbank as an institutionalized lender of last resort.2" This institution is partly financed
by the banking sector so that in situations involving banking failure where support is
22. See ss.22, 24, 31 Banking Act; 9, 11, 34, 34a, 35 Securities Trading Act.
23. For further examples, see the powers of the Federal Securities Supervisory Office to issue guidance and
guidelines under the Securities Trading Act, e.g. ss. 29(1), 35(6) Securities Trading Act. For further discussion
in this respect, see Assmann, fi. 15, nn. 22-28.
24. See, F REIsCFIAUER &J. KLEINHANS, KWG. LOSEBLA'rKOMMENTAR FOR DIE PRAXis (1995), s. 45 Banking
Act n. 1; KREDITWESENGESETZ. KoMMENTAR zu KWG UND AUSFOHRUNGSVORSCHRIFTEN (Karl-Heinz Boos et
al. eds., 2d ed. 2004); s. 45 Banking Act n. 6.
25. See Boos, supra note 24.
26. Cf, art. 2, nos. 9 (amendments to s.7 Banking Act), 46 (amendments to s.44 Banking Act) FinDAG.
27. Id.
28. See Carl Theodor Samm, Zur Novellierung des Kreditwesengesetzes, in OSTERREICHisCHEs BANIKENARCHIV
312 (1976).
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granted, the financial burden does not lie on the taxpayer alone. 9 Nevertheless, the insti-
tution's limited resources would probably render it almost meaningless in any major in-
solvency. The successful reorganization of the SMH-Bank in 1983 demonstrates one of the
rare applications of this mechanism.30
IV. The Evolution of Deposit Insurance Within Germany
A. OVERVIEW
Since the transposition of the EC deposit insurance and investor compensation directives,
deposit insurance systems exist in a variety of forms. Within the commercial banking group,
the Deposit Insurance Fund (Einlagensicberungfonds) set up by the Private Bankers' Asso-
ciation (Bundesverband Deutscber Banken) was the first provider of deposit insurance to bank-
ing institutions. Indeed, set up by the association and thus essentially by the market partic-
ipants themselves as early as 1969 (with regional precursors dating back to the immediate
aftermath of World War II), the initiative seems to be the very first of its kind in Europe.3
As a consequence of the transposition of the above EC directives into German law in
1998,32 the existing fund was complemented with a mandatory deposit insurance scheme
set up so as to comply with the minimum level of depositor protection prescribed by the
directives. The key difference between the two systems is that membership with the Deposit
Insurance Fund has always been and continues to be voluntary, while all commercial banks
are required by statute to contribute to the new mandatory scheme, the Entscbddigungsein-
richtung Deutscher Banken (Compensation Scheme of German Banks).
As noted above, insolvencies of banks in the past have involved commercial banks,-
banking institutions in private ownership or listed companies that were competing in the
markets without affiliation to public bodies or cooperative structures. Therefore, the fol-
lowing analysis focuses almost completely on the emergence of deposit insurance for com-
mercial banks with relatively few remarks on the structures that have been developed for
public savings banks and cooperative banks.
B. DEPOSIT INSURANCE FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS
1. The Deposit Insurance Fund
As noted above, the creation of the Deposit Insurance Fund as a subsidiary of the Private
Bankers' Association dates back to 1969. In the legislative process leading to the enactment
of the modern Banking Act in 1961, 31 the legislator contemplated the introduction of a
29. Cf. H. Engler & J. Essinger, The Future of Banking, London (2000), at 304 (citing the statement of Ernst
Welteke, President of Bundesbank).
30. SMH (an acronym for the merged private banks of Schroeder, Miinchmeyer, Hengst & Co.) went into
deep waters in 1983. Following informal meetings of the Supervisory Body, the Bundesbank, and the major
German banks, the main creditors agreed to provide further liquidity. Formal insolvency proceedings were
prevented, and the bank was taken over by a foreign institution. See T. Kramer, Der SMH-Fall. Eine Fallstudie
an Hand von Presseveroffenlibcungen (1985) (providing an account of the SMH case).
31. See, W PAPENTHIN, DER ZUGANG zuR EINLAGENSICHERUNG DES PRIVATEN BANKGEWERBES 14 (Hamburg
1999).
32. Einlagensicherungs- mrd Anlegerentschiidigungsgesetz [Law on the Compensation of Depositors and
Investors), v. 16.07.1998 (BGB1. I, S. 1842) (ER.G.).
33. Seesupra, Part IM.
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statutory deposit insurance system as a corollary to the special status enjoyed by both public
savings banks and cooperative banks. A report commissioned by Parliament recommended
the introduction of a mandatory fund of at least 200 million D-Marks, while offering cov-
erage in the amount of 10,000.00 D-Marks per depositor to participant institutions.3 4 In
order to avoid legislative pressure and retain influence over the fund's terms and conditions,
the Private Bankers Association decided to establish a self-governed but nonetheless for-
malized and reliable institution in return for the abandonment of the legislative proposals.
The legislature agreed, and the Fund was implemented."
In the aftermath of the notorious failure of the Cologne-based Bankhaus Herstatt in
1974, strong political pressure was exercised on the Fund and its members once again. This
pressure was aimed specifically at the perceived level of insufficient protection offered by
the fund. Again, interest groups and political parties expressed demands for a mandatory
system independent of the Private Bankers' Association, the market participants' lobby
organization. In order to avoid legislative measures, the Association again agreed to amend
the Fund's terms and conditions, and provided for a comprehensive improvement of de-
positor protection in the event of bank insolvency.3 6
Membership with the Fund is voluntary, but all member banks of the Private Bankers'
Association are required to obtain membership.37 For competitive reasons, however, most
private banks (as opposed to public savings banks and cooperative banks) operating within
the country have become participants.3"
Membership is subject to restrictive entry criteria. All participant institutions are super-
vised and audited on an on-going basis by the Auditing Association of German Banks
(Prufungsverband deutscber Banken), another subsidiary of the Private Bankers' Association,
pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(7) and 8 of the statute. The participant institutions are thereby
subjected to an additional level of prudential regulation and supervision in addition to the
statutory supervision exercised by BaFin under the Banking Act. The de facto coexistence
of both seems to have been highly effective in the past. Indeed, it appears that many cases
of financial irregularities within participating institutions were discovered by the Fund or
the Auditing Association rather than the supervisory authorities.3 9
The level of coverage offered by the Fund is defined in paragraph six of the statute. As
a rule, it encompasses all liabilities of a member institution to non-banks and investment
companies and their custodian banks. The coverage also extends to investment fund assets,
for each creditor up to a ceiling of 30 percent of the member bank's liable capital (tier 1).
Evidently, this amounts to full coverage of most ordinary bank deposits. The insolvency of
Bankhaus Krebs in Freiburg, serves as an example of the very generous protection offered
by the Fund. In 1995, the small banking institution became insolvent; individuals who
34. See Bericht der Bundesregierung iber die Untersuchung der Wettbewerbsverschiebungen im Kredit-
gewerber und uber eine Einlagensicherung, Bundestags-Drucksache V/350, 30 June 2004.
35. Cf. PAPENTHIN, supra note 31, at 21.
36. The legal basis for the Fund's operation is formulated in its statute, currently in a 2004 English version,
availabk at http://www.bankenverband.de/download/broschueren/0405-Statut-.en.pdf(last visited Jan. 26, 2005)
[hereinafter The Statute).
37. See The Statute, supra note 36, at para. 2a.
38. See http://www.bankenverband.de/pic/artikelpic/092004/0406- statut-kurz.en.pdf (last visited Jan. 26,
2005) (containing a list of participating institutions).
39. According to information provided by the Private Bankers' Association. See Binder, supra note 19, § 12
D. 111. 1.
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deposited about D-Mark 22 million with the institution were reported to have received D-
Mark 17 million as compensation from the Fund.40 There is no co-insurance, so deposits
are compensated in full up to the overall ceiling.
The question of whether or not depositors have an individually enforceable right to
protection by the Fund is a matter of lengthy debate in the academic literature. While the
Fund itself tried to exclude such liability in its terms and conditions, strong arguments have
been made that such rights arise under general principles of the German law of obligations,
as a consequence of the Fund's self-portrayal as guarantor of deposits in the public. Given
that the Fund has not failed to meet its promise in the past, a refusal to pay would appear
imaginable only in exceptional cases. A possible exception might arise in connection with
the insolvency of a very large banking institution; however, in such a case public support
under the "too big to fail" doctrine would in all likelihood be granted anyhow. Hence, the
question of enforceable rights appears to be one of rather academic interest with no practical
relevance.41
Financing is organized through contributions by the participant banks on a mixed ex-
ante and ex-post basis.42 Pursuant to paragraph two of the statute, the Fund's mandate is
defined as follows:
(1) The purpose of the Fund is to give assistance, in the interest of depositors, in the
event of imminent or actual financial difficulties of banks, particularly when the sus-
pension of payments is imminent, in order to prevent the impairment of public con-
fidence in private banks.
(2) All measures apt to be of assistance may be taken in the implementation of the pur-
pose described in subsection (1), in particular payments to individual creditors, ...
payments to banks, the assumption of guarantees or the assumption of obligations in
connection with action taken under [paragraph] 46a German Banking Act.
It follows from the cited provision that assistance by the Fund in cases of actual or
imminent insolvency can take a variety of forms. After the imposition of a statutory mor-
atorium under paragraph 46a Banking Act, most insolvent banks in the past were simply
liquidated according to the procedures available under general insolvency law. In such cases,
the Fund merely paid the covered deposits. Insofar as it satisfies the claims of depositors,
the claims are then subrogated to the Fund, which will claim the insolvency dividend just
as any other creditor.43 As a result, the Fund occupies a strong position in the general body
of creditors that commands the key decision-making powers within insolvency procedures.
Alternatively, the Fund may opt for the provision of liquidity or even capital support to
a bank in crisis. It chooses this option if such support appears commercially beneficial in
view of the expected complexity associated with liquidation or after considering the sale of
the insolvent institution's business to a competitor or other interested investor. The fund
may also provide direct financial support for a merger or merely support the transfer of the
insured deposit base to another bank prior to the winding up of the bank's business. Re-
cently, the Fund exercised this right in response to the failure of Schmidtbank, a regional
40. See Badische Zeitung 9 September 1995, p. 3.
41. See Binder, supra note 19, at § 12 D. 11. 4.
42. See The Statute, supra note 36, at para. 5.
43. See Binder, supra note 19, at § 12 D. I1. 6.
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bank in Bavaria." Overall, the Fund is empowered to play an active role in the management
of imminent crises. In fact, considering the leverage created by its power to provide financial
support, its relevance in crisis may even exceed that of the supervisory authority. This is
reflected in the legal framework for bank crisis management which provides in paragraph
46a of the Banking Act, that the supervisory authorities may coordinate protective measures
with the deposit insurance scheme4
5
In summary, the Deposit Insurance Fund can aptly be described as a unique combination
of virtually unlimited coverage with no co-insurance on one hand and strong elements of
peer monitoring and peer pressure on the other. This arguably helps market participants
and customers avoid the adverse incentives otherwise ascribed to full-coverage systems.
Though far from being in line with internationally accepted best practice in the area, the
scheme appears to have worked reasonably well in the past& and is likely to continue to do
so in the future, unless and until extraordinary payments in connection with a single large
scale failure or a series of costly insolvencies in the banking sector exhausts its resources.
Particularly noteworthy is the degree to which the fund is integrated into the legal and
institutional framework for bank crisis management on a defacto basis, without any formal
links to the supervisory authority and without any clear statutory mandate.
2. Mandatory Deposit Protection: The Compensation Scheme of German Banks
As a consequence of the transposition of the EC Deposit Insurance Directive in 1998,
the Private Bankers' Association set up the Compensation Scheme of German Banks (Ent-
schadigungseinrichtung Deutscher Banken). The scheme, established as a private limited com-
pany, is a subsidiary of the Association. Like the Deposit Protection Fund, it has no legal
or organizational links with supervisory authorities. Membership with the scheme is com-
pulsory for all private commercial banks, irrespective of whether or not they already par-
ticipate in the Deposit Insurance Fund. The new scheme merely serves as a payout mech-
anism for the minimum level of protection guaranteed by the directive. If payments are
made to depositors of banks that also participate in the Deposit Insurance Fund, the Fund
then increases the payment to its own level of protection .4 Therefore, the Fund remains
largely unaffected by the establishment of the new scheme. Given the rather low level of
protection provided by the new scheme, the Deposit Insurance Fund continues to be the
most important player in the management of banking crises. Cpnsequently, the compen-
sation scheme is of only secondary interest in the context of this article. 4
s
C. DEPOSIT INSURANCE FOR OTHER BANKING GROUPS
Within the Savings Banks Group, a similar deposit insurance scheme, the Compensation
Scheme of the Federal Association of Public Banks, was established to meet the minimum
44. Id.
45. For example, pursuant to paragraph 46 a (1) Banking Act, a moratorium imposed on an insolvent bank
may provide for exemptions insofar as the payout of compensation by the deposit insurer is effected via the
insolvent bank. See, e.g., Binder, supra note 19, at § 12 D. mII. 6.
46. See also Thorsten Beck, Deposit Insurance as a Private Club: The Case of Germany, Q. REv. EcoN. & FIN.
701-719 (2002). The 2000 draft is available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/bios/tbeck/beck2.pdf (last
visited Jan. 26, 2005).
47. See Binder, supra note 19, at § 12 D. III. 7.
48. See also Deutsche Bundesbank, Deposit protection and investor protection in Germany, DEUTSCHE BUNDES-
BANK MONTHLY REPORT 29-45 (July 2000).
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criteria stipulated by the EC directives. This scheme is, again, a private corporation set up
by the Federal Association in its capacity of head organization for public banks. Within the
Cooperative Banks Group, existing arrangements for the institutional protection of banks
in crisis were reinforced in order to meet the EC law requirements. For the reasons men-
tioned above, both arrangements are negligible in this article.49
V. Summary and Conclusions
The Deposit Insurance Fund set up by the Private Bankers' Association continues to be
the most important deposit protection scheme in Germany. Its far-reaching functions, with
regard to both preventive regulation and the resolution of bank insolvency, remain largely
unaffected by both the transposition of the EC Deposit Insurance directive in 1998 and the
reform of the institutional framework for banking and financial markets supervision in 2002.
The Fund is a private organization with no legal or institutional links with the unified
financial services supervisory authority. It is funded exclusively by participant banks and is,
in effect, a self-governing body that exercises a strong level of peer monitoring and peer
pressure on member banks. While BaFin, the new financial services supervisory authority,
retains legal powers for crisis management and formal intervention, the Fund plays a highly
significant role by closely monitoring its members' on-going business, in addition to its
capacity as potential provider of financial help during crisis. With virtually unlimited levels
of protection and the lack of any co-insurance, the Fund certainly deviates significantly
from internationally accepted best practice in the area. Nonetheless, it appears to have been
rather successful in the past, without creating adverse incentives that undermine financial
stability.
The German example thus indicates that comparative "lessons learned" in the area of
deposit insurance may be difficult to reach. The unique structure of the German banking
system certainly facilitated the emergence of a strong association of market participants that
commanded sufficient influence with the legislator, resulting in the creation of a powerful
deposit protection scheme in return for the legislator's abdication of statutory requirements
in this area. The participants' readiness to provide virtually unlimited coverage to most
deposits can be linked to the very restrictive entry and membership criteria that all partic-
ipant banks must subject themselves to, which operate to minimize risk. Lastly, the Fund's
structure and its terms and conditions are hardly imaginable without the strong influence
of large banks, which provide the bulk of the funding but also have strong incentives to use
the Fund as a tool to closely monitor and, to some extent, control their smaller competitors.
Consequently, it would appear that when looking for "best practices" as alternatives to
existing structures, attention should be given to the question of whether local market struc-
tures merit the establishment of individual concepts tailored to local needs, as opposed to
implementation of abstract, internationally accepted standards. While the fundamental
finding that deposit insurance must reflect market structures is clearly in line with the
recommendations concerning deposit insurance issued by the Financial Stability Forum
(FSF) in 2001,50 many discrepancies exist between the German model and FSF's institu-
49. See M. Wagner, Die Einlagensicherung bei Banken und Sparkassen nach dem Einagensicherungs-und
Anlegerentschdigungsgesetz 47-62 (2004).
50. Id. at n. 2.
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tional recommendations regarding membership, financing, and coverage. Generally, the
success of the German model so far appears to militate some scepticism with regard to these
FSF findings.
Finally, the German model indicates that the institutional choice to create a single fi-
nancial regulator on one hand and to structure a deposit insurance system on the other, are
entirely separate issues independent from one another. While deposit insurance is certainly
an important cornerstone of the overall regulatory concept, its translation into institutional
arrangements can take place more or less without special attention to the supervisory in-
frastructure as such. Indeed, if the German model provides any answer at all in this context,
it might be that some institutional competition between a strong deposit insurer and the
banking supervisor is beneficial in maintaining financial stability. This, however, would
apply equally to legal systems without a unified financial services supervisor.
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